The Normativity of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2017, paperback  2021).



  • Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, review by Tim Henning (Print Version)[Link].
  • Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, review by Vuko Andrić (Print Version).
  • Ethics, review by Clayton Littlejohn [Link].
  • Journal of Moral Philosophy, review of Zachariah Wrublewski (Print Version).
  • Mind, review by Conor McHugh (Print Version).
  • Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, review by Alex Worsnip (Webpage).
  • The Philosophical Review, review by John Brunero [Link].
  • Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur, review by Eva Schmidt (Webpage).



  • PEA Soup, book review discussion forum (Webpage).
  • Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, book symposion with comments by Gerhard Ernst [Link] and Erasmus Mayr  [Link], and a précis [Link] and replies [Link] by Benjamin Kiesewetter.

Peer-Reviewed Articles

1. "Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number", Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13, 190–214, 2023. (PDF)


2. "Structural Rationality" (with Alex Worsnip), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, URL =, 2023. [PDF]


3. “Are Epistemic Reasons Normative?, Noûs 56 (3): 670–695, 2022.  [PDF]


4. “Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17, 27–53, 2022. [PDF]


5. Klimaaktivismus als ziviler Ungehorsam [Climate Activism as Civil Disobedience], Zeitschrift für praktische Philosophie 9 (1): 77–114, 2022. [PDF]


6. Practical Conflicts As a Problem for Epistemic Reductionism about Reasons (with Jan Gertken), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3): 677–86, 2022. [PDF]


7. How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means? (with Jan Gertken), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99 (2): 271–85, 2021. [PDF]


8. “Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness, Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4): 332-42, 2020. [PDF]


9. “Can the Lottery Paradox be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic Permissibility?, Episteme  16 (3): 241–61, 2019. [PDF]


10. Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles, Ethics 129 (1): 98–115, 2018. (PDF)


11. What Kind of Perspectivism?, Journal of Moral Philosophy 15(4): 415–43, 2018. [PDF]


12. The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons” (with Jan Gertken), Philosophy Compass  12(5), e12412, 2017. [PDF]

13. “You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe that You Ought to  ΦThe Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265): 76082, 2016. [PDF]
14. “Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle", Ethics  125 (4): 92146, 2015. [PDF]
15. “A Dilemma for Parfit’s Conception of Normativity”Analysis 72 (3): 46674, 2012. [PDF]
16. “‘Ought’ and the Perspective of the Agent”Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3): 124, 2011. [PDF]
17. “Dürfen wir Kindern das Wahlrecht vorenthalten?” [Are We Justified to Deny Children the Right to Vote?], Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 95 (2): 25273, 2009. [PDF]


Translated into Japanese by Toshiro Terada: “子どもに選挙権を与 えないことは許されるか?”, PRIME 33, Meiji Gakuin Daigaku, 6381, 2011. [PDF]

Book Chapters and Further Publications


1. Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons", in Value, Morality, and Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, edited by Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr and Jakob Werkmäster, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University, 239–49, 2023. [PDF]


2. “Normative und motivierende Gründe: Ein Kommentar zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 72 (3): 4218, 2018. [PDF]


3. “How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence”, in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 90114, 2018. [PDF]


4. Précis zu The Normativity of Rationality, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 71 (4): 5604, 2017. [PDF]


5. Repliken, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 71 (4): 57883, 2017. [PDF]


6. Willensschwäche, in: Aristoteles-Handbuch, ed. Rapp, Christof/Corcilius, Klaus, Stuttgart: Metzler, 38992, 2011. [Handbook article on Aristotle's conception of weakness of will; substantially revised and updated for the 2nd ed. Berlin: Metzler/Springer, 453–57, 2021.]


7.  Translation of Burnyeat, M.F. 1980: Aristotle on Learning to be Good. (Lernen, ein guter Mensch zu sein. Aristoteles über moralische Bildung und Charakterentwicklung, in: Wissen und Bildung in der antiken Philosophie, ed. Rapp, Christof/Wagner, Tim, Stuttgart: Metzler, 21537, 2006.


8.  Wir sind nicht Eure Zukunft! Über den Status von jungen Menschen und ihren Grundrechten" in: Auf der Suche nach neuen Wegen. Alter(n) und Gesellschaft, ed. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Berlin 1721, 1999. ["We Are Not Your Future! On the Status of Young People and their Basic Rights. ]


9. Die 68er und ihre Kinder - ein Plädoyer gegen antiautoritäre und jede andere Erziehung”, in: Die 68er. Warum wir Jungen sie nicht mehr brauchen, ed. Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen, Freiburg: Kore, 13970, 1998. ["The '68 Generation and their Children - a Plea Against Anti-authoritarian and All Other Kinds of Pedagogics."]


10. Die Gleichberechtigung der jungen Generation, in: Ihr habt dieses Land nur von uns geborgt, ed. Gesellschaft für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen, Hamburg: Rasch und Röhring, 30933, 1997. ["Equal Rights for the Young Generation."]

Book Reviews


1. Review of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality, by Alex Worsnip, forthcoming in Mind. (Preprint)


2. “Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (3): 481–91, 2020 (Review of From A Rational Point of View, by Tim Henning). (Original Review, Preprint).


3. Review of The Value of Rationality, by Ralph Wedgwood, Ethics 129 (3), 501–8, 2019. (Original Review, Preprint)

Work in Progress


1.  "How To Be a Deontologist and Still Save the Greater Number".


2. "What We May Expect of Each Other: A Theory of Moral Obligation".


3. "Epistemic Normativity Without Epistemic Teleology".